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Working Memory and Attention – Response to 
Commentaries
Klaus Oberauer
University of Zurich, CH
k.oberauer@psychologie.uzh.ch
This is a brief reply to the commentaries by Adam and deBettencourt (2019); Allen (2019); 
Kiyonaga (2019); Schneider (2019); and Van der Stigchel and Olivers (2019), focusing on four 
topics: (1) I defend the idea that attention need not be characterized as a limited resource. (2) I 
explain how I conceptualize the role of WM in cognitive control, and how recruitment of sensory 
processing networks contributes to control but not maintenance. (3) I discuss different ways in 
which information can be selectively prioritized during or after being encoded into WM, and the 
different consequences of these processes. (4) I argue that sustained attention to a task can 
be understood as the mind’s ability to prioritize that task over task-unrelated representations.
Keywords: Attention; Working memory; Memory
I am grateful for the five commentaries on my target article (Oberauer, 2019) because they underscore 
the diversity of perspectives on the relation of working memory (WM) and attention, and emphasize a few 
aspects that I had neglected in the target article. I find myself in agreement with most of the comments. In 
this reply I focus on what I believe to be the most important points for future discussion.
Attention as a Resource
A common theme of several commentaries is the assumption that attention is a limited resource. For 
instance, Kiyonaga (2019) argues that attention “is capacity limited and therefore must be selective”, and 
Allen (2019) describes attention as a limited resource that causes a capacity limit, which “underlines the 
importance of ‘perceptual’ selection”. I think we should also consider the reverse direction of causality 
 (Neumann, 1987): Attention is the mind’s mechanism for selective prioritization, and the apparent capacity 
limit arises from this function: As the target of attention is prioritized for processing, competing representa-
tions are suppressed to increase the signal-to-noise ratio of selection. As a consequence, it becomes difficult 
to attend to several distinct representational units at the same time because prioritizing each of them entails 
suppression of the others.
Allen (2019) argues that the vulnerability of WM performance to dual-task costs demonstrates the involve-
ment of an executive-attention resource in WM. The explanation of dual-task costs as arising from resource 
sharing is appealing, but there are a few aspects of the dual-task costs suffered by WM tasks that render this 
explanation questionable. First, dual-task costs are asymmetric between content domains: Visual-spatial 
WM contents are vulnerable to the concurrent maintenance or processing of verbal information but verbal 
WM contents are less vulnerable to concurrent maintenance or processing of visual-spatial contents (Morey, 
2018; Morey, Morey, van der Reijden, & Holweg, 2013). This asymmetry is difficult to explain by resource 
sharing: If verbal and visual-spatial representations compete for the same resource, then both should suffer 
dual-task costs; if they don’t, then none of them should. Second, as I mentioned in the target article, dual-
task costs between WM maintenance and a processing demand diminish and often disappear when memory 
encoding and processing task are temporally separated by a few seconds. This observation rules out the idea 
that WM maintenance and processing compete for the same resource.
One example for the latter observation is the study of Kiyonaga, Dowd, and Egner (2017): Participants 
held faces or houses in WM and did a visual-search task (searching for vertical objects) during the retention 
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interval. The difficulty of both task components was varied. Search difficulty had no effect on WM perfor-
mance, and WM load had no effect on search performance, perhaps because the search task commenced 
only 2.5 to 5 s after WM encoding. Decoding of the WM content category (face vs. house) from brain areas 
known to be involved in perceptual processing of these stimuli dropped to chance during the visual-search 
task. Yet, the WM category could still be decoded from other areas in the ventral stream even during visual 
search. Kiyonaga (2019) argues that this study shows how competition for resources can be masked by con-
trol processes – in this case, processes that transfer WM representations from perceptual-processing areas 
to other brain areas when visual attention is engaged by a competing demand in the retention interval. I 
agree that this study attests to the flexibility of WM maintenance: Information about visual stimuli such as 
faces and houses can be kept active in the relevant perceptual-processing areas, but WM maintenance does 
not depend on that because the same information is also represented elsewhere throughout the retention 
interval. At the same time, I don’t see why we need the concept of a shared resource to explain these find-
ings. We don’t need to assume that face and house information disappeared from perceptual areas because 
a limited resource was taken away from them. An alternative interpretation is that they disappeared because 
keeping them would be tantamount to using them as search templates that guide perceptual attention (Van 
der Stigchel & Olivers, 2019), and this would disrupt the search for vertical objects. What looks like compe-
tition for a shared resource could simply be a side effect of the fact that attention needs to be selective to 
fulfil its function.
WM and Cognitive Control
A second theme touched upon by several commentaries is the role of WM in controlling perceptual atten-
tion and action. Schneider (2019) emphasizes that WM is needed for holding bindings between stimulus 
categories and response categories, especially when they are newly instructed so that they could not have 
been acquired in long-term memory. Such representations of new task sets in WM are needed not only in 
task-switching situations, but every time a person wants to implement a new relation between a perceived 
situation and an action (Meiran, Liefooghe, & De Houwer, 2017).
This idea fits well into the general hypothesis of “attention as an emergent property” proposed by Van der 
Stigchel and Olivers (2019): Activation of a goal (e.g., to follow the experimenter’s instructions) entails selec-
tive activation of representations relevant for that goal, including the instructed mappings between stimu-
lus and response categories (e.g., “if you see a cat, press left; if you see a dog, press right”), and the relevant 
perceptual and motor representations (e.g., visual images of typical cats and dogs, and motor programs 
for pressing the left and the right key). Van der Stigchel and Olivers argue that activation of task-relevant 
perceptual and motor representations agrees well with the sensory-recruitment hypothesis, according to 
which maintenance of perceptual information in WM relies on the same neural networks that are involved 
in perceptual processing of that information.
In my view, there is no strong conceptual relation between the attention-as-emergent-property hypothesis 
and the sensory-recruitment hypothesis. It is probably true that the activation of a goal leads to activation 
of goal-relevant representations associated to it, including sensory representations, but that does not mean 
that sensory representations are causally relevant for maintenance of information in WM. They probably 
are not, because maintenance does not appear to suffer when information in sensory areas is erased by 
competing stimuli (Bettencourt & Xu, 2016; Kiyonaga et al., 2017). An alternative interpretation of the find-
ings showing information about WM contents in sensory brain areas is that maintenance relies on more 
abstract representations, which are back-projected into sensory areas. Through this back-projection WM 
contents could bias perceptual processing. In this interpretation, sensory processing areas are recruited not 
for maintenance of information in WM but for enabling WM contents to influence perceptual attention. I 
believe that this idea largely agrees with the position of Van der Stigchel and Olivers, except that I see a place 
for memory representations that are not currently in the focus of attention, and hence are not maintained 
in sensory areas, and yet are in WM, rather than being outsourced into long-term memory. If it were easy to 
outsource all currently unattended WM contents into long-term memory, it would be mysterious why the 
capacity of WM is so stubbornly limited.
Attention Controlling the Contents of WM
Allen (2019) describes some of the ways in which attention governs selective encoding of information into 
WM. Access to WM is controlled by a filter that can implement a conjunction of spatial, temporal, and 
feature-based criteria for admission (e.g., encoding only the red stimuli on the left of the screen, or only 
the first four stimuli in a sequence). This filter is imperfect, so that information matching some but not all 
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criteria can slip through – for instance an irrelevant suffix following a set of memory items when the suffix 
belongs to the same category as the memory items (Allen, Castellà, Ueno, Hitch, & Baddeley, 2015). Kiyonaga 
(2019) makes a similar observation.
People can also follow instructions to give certain list items priority. Whereas people’s ability to filter out 
irrelevant items is unaffected by a secondary task, their ability to selectively prioritize some of the memory 
items is impaired by a secondary task, suggesting that the two processes differ qualitatively (Hu, Allen, 
Baddeley, & Hitch, 2016). At first glance this dissociation is puzzling because prioritization can be under-
stood as a more lenient form of selective attention, encoding the prioritized items more strongly without 
completely neglecting the not-prioritized ones. The difference could be explained as follows: Filtering out 
an irrelevant stimulus is like filtering out distractors in visual search: Attention is guided to stimuli that 
match the target template, and the more dissimilar stimuli are to that template the less likely they are to 
be attended, and by implication, encoded into WM. In the suffix paradigm, the target template is constant 
across trials (“the first four color-shape combinations”) and therefore does not have to be maintained in WM; 
constant search templates can guide perceptual attention directly from LTM (Woodman, Carlisle, & Reinhart, 
2013). Therefore, we should not expect filtering to be impaired by a secondary task. Selectively prioritizing 
some items could be done by assigning these items more time for encoding, and perhaps post-encoding 
processing (e.g., short-term consolidation, refreshing, or elaboration) (Oberauer & Lewandowsky, in press). 
This requires that there is free time for such additional processing, of which there is less when a secondary 
task is to be carried out concurrently. Therefore, we should expect prioritization to be less effective under 
dual-task demands, and more generally under conditions with little free time.
Individual items in a memory set can also be prioritized after encoding of an entire memory set when 
attention is directed to these items during the retention interval by a retro-cue (Souza & Oberauer, 2016). 
Whereas items prioritized during encoding are made more vulnerable to interference by an irrelevant suffix 
(Allen, 2019; Allen & Ueno, 2018), items prioritized during the retention interval in response to a retro-cue 
are made less vulnerable to interference by subsequent visual stimuli (Souza, Rerko, & Oberauer, 2016; van 
Moorselaar, Gunseli, Theeuwes, & Olivers, 2015). Future research will hopefully find out why these two vari-
ants of prioritization have opposing consequences for the prioritized contents’ vulnerability to perceptual 
interference.
Working Memory and Sustained Attention
Adam and deBettencourt (2019) describe the covariation of sustained attention and performance in a visual 
WM task. I am grateful for this addition because I have neglected sustained attention in my review. It is 
tempting to interpret the waxing and waning of sustained attention as the reflection of an attentional 
resource that fluctuates over time (deBettencourt, Keene, Awh, & Vogel, 2019), but again, there is an alterna-
tive interpretation in terms of selective attention that does not require the concept of a resource: Sustained 
attention can be characterized as sustained prioritization of task-relevant over task-irrelevant representa-
tions. In this view, fluctuations of sustained attention over time reflect the trajectory of “mind wandering”: 
Sometimes selective attention is directed more towards the experimental task, and on other occasions it 
is directed more to task-unrelated thoughts. When attention is directed to task-unrelated thoughts, these 
thoughts are likely to interfere with the experimental task, impairing performance. In line with this inter-
pretation, earlier work has shown that performance in the same visual WM task used by deBettencourt et 
al. (2019) also correlates with people’s self-report on whether they had been thinking of the WM task or of 
task-unrelated issues (Adam & Vogel, 2017).
An important question for future research is whether fluctuations of sustained attention are specifically 
related to WM, or whether they affect performance in a broad class of cognitive activities of which doing a 
WM task just happens to be an instance. Adam and deBettencourt (2019) highlighted the great potential of 
experimental techniques to measure the covariation of performance indicators over time. These covariations 
could become a second source of information about associations and dissociations of cognitive mechanisms, 
complementing covariations across individuals that have been instrumental for studying the relation of 
WM and attention for several decades (Keye, Wilhelm, Oberauer, & van Ravenzwaaij, 2009; McVay & Kane, 
2012; Unsworth, Redick, Lakey, & Young, 2010; Unsworth & Robison, 2017). Measuring multiple indicators 
of sustained attention, WM, and other constructs to assess their covariation matrix over time, we could use 
structural-equation modelling to determine these constructs on the latent-variable level.
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